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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the relationship between board size and firm performance. This relationship 
is tested in the light of Pareto Approach for Pakistani banking sector. For this purpose a sample 
of fourteen listed commercial banks of Pakistan are taken for analysis from 2008-2012 on the 
basis of their performance. Different econometric models are applied to test the relationship 
between bank performance variables and corporate governance practices in these banks. The 
results of this study are contradictory with the existing literature of corporate governance 
variables and firm performance. The most prominent result of this paper is the significant positive 
relationship between board size and bank performance. It is concluded in the findings that a large 
board size can enhance the bank performance in Pakistani scenario. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he role of corporate governance in today’s corporate world is gaining importance day by day. That is 
the very reason academicians around the world are paying more attention developing and testing the 
existing and new practices of corporate governance. The evolution of new rules and codes of 
governance is a significant achievement of these researchers and practitioner, but there is still a huge gap in the 
development of new corporate governance codes for under developed countries which needs to be filled sooner in 
order to achieve better firm performance. Albeit, today’s world is known as a global village but no one can apply the 
new set of governance rules for every part of the world. It is the fact that due to diverse culture, different financial 
environment, and heterogeneous legal frame work of the countries, these codes may not be useful for every country. 
In today’s corporate world every country has to develop its own set of codes and rules of corporate governance. 
 
The evolution process of corporate governance codes had started from the developed world and gradually 
passed on to developing countries. But no significant amount of work has been done for under developing countries 
in order to suggest news rules of corporate governance. In developed countries, the new codes of corporate 
governance are not only introduced but are practiced frequently in their corporate sectors. By practicing these new 
rules and codes of corporate governance the corporate sector of the western world is gaining success by significant 
increases in their firm performance. On the other hand, the same set of corporate governance rules do not give the 
same success to the corporate sector of the under developing countries. The reason is very obvious and logical that 
due to different financial and legal environments of under developing countries, one cannot get the same results 
from using those codes which are developed for western and civilized countries. In fact, this practice might create 
some serious consequences in these parts of the world in the form of disturbing foreign and domestic inflows. 
T 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – September/October 2014 Volume 30, Number 5 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1396 The Clute Institute 
Un-doubtfully, corporate governance is the smooth and safe road for investors to achieve good results in 
term of profits and returns (Smith, 1996; Huson, 1997; Nesbitt, 1994; Carleton et al., 1998; Strickland et al., 1996). 
Corporate governance is defined in several ways; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OCED) explained "Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its 
board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the 
objectives of the company are set, and the means of obtaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined." Cadbury Committee (1992) defined it as "The system by which companies are directed and 
controlled." 
 
From the given explanation of corporate governance, one can understand that it’s all about the protection of 
shareholders rights. It is very obvious that the shareholder has zero tolerance about firm performance. It is argued 
that the outcome of good governance is good performance (Yang, 2011; Andres, 2008; Tandelilin, 2007; Aebi el al., 
2010). Things are very simple and straight as far as corporate governance practices and its importance is concerned, 
but things are complicated when different variables of corporate governance are taken under consideration like 
board size, number of meetings in a year, profile of CEO, ownership structure, etc. No doubt all these variables have 
their due importance but their combination is very critical for achieving good governance and better performance. 
This issue got academicians attention very promptly and many researchers have come up with different and 
interesting results. Every author has defended his findings in a very logical and sophisticated way. 
 
This paper contributes something new and interesting in the existing debate of corporate governance codes 
by borrowing one famous economic theory: Economic Pareto Efficiency (1848-1923) theory. This theory explains 
that it is impossible to make any individual better off without making at least one individual worse off. This paper is 
motivated by this theory and its application in Pakistan’s financial market. Pakistan is an under developing country 
that is sixty four years old. It is a common fact that, more or less, all under developing countries are not good at 
governance. So Pakistan is not an exception. In the Pakistan corporate sector, one local term is very commonly used 
which needs to be defined; i.e., “Seith Culture” or “Vedera Culture” which means a group of people who have a lot 
of money and authority in the society and they can run their own businesses in their own style. Due to this culture 
they appoint their likeminded people as members of the board of directors. Later, those directors implement “Seith” 
agenda and protect Seith’s (an individual with a specific approach and mind set) interest at the cost of minority 
shareholders rights. The number of studies in the western world suggested that smaller board size can enhance firm 
performance; e.g., Jensen (1993) suggests that board sizes in the U.S. tend to be too large and should not be more 
than 8 directors. This may be true for developed economies but might not be true for under developing countries like 
Pakistan. 
 
That is the very reason this study suggests opposite model for Pakistan. For this purpose a sample of 
Pakistani private and state owned commercial banks is taken for analysis. These banks are further classified into 
conventional and Islamic banks. Pakistan has been introducing a liberal and efficient financial market since 1980 
(State Bank of Pakistan, 1980) by privatizing state-owned banks and encouraging new domestic and foreign entries 
into the market. Apart from these financial reforms, a Code of Corporate Governance has been implemented to all 
listed companies in Pakistan to encourage good governance in 2002, which was introduced by the Securities 
Exchange of Pakistan. The rest of the paper consists of following parts: Part 2 includes review of literature, Part 3 
explains data and methodology, and finally Part 4 discusses the findings and conclusion. 
 
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
The relationship between corporate governance, especially board size and firm performance, is still a 
fundamental issue for researchers. Prior studies in this context put more focus on the performance but ignore the 
cultural phenomena (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Morck et al., 1988). This study extends the literature with this 
hypothesis that a firm with larger board size has a positive relationship with its performance under specific cultural 
aspects. 
 
There is a consensus among academicians that a large board size causes a coordination problem between 
members. Jensen (1993) suggests that board sizes in the U.S. tend to be too large and should not be more than 8 
directors. On the other hand, there may be a tradeoff between coordination cost and prospective ideas. If we ignore 
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the coordination cost, a large board size can add more ideas to the board which may be beneficial for the firm in the 
decision making process. 
 
In some cultures, businesses are controlled by small dominated groups like family members and they run 
their business for their own interest; this fact has encouraged some scholars to study the influence of such boards on 
firms performance (Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Dalton et al., 1998). The Pareto Efficiency 
(1848-1923) theory explains the phenomena that it is impossible to make any one individual better off without 
making at least one individual worse off. This paper also argues that board of directors are always making decisions 
just for the betterment of themselves and making the minority shareholders worse off. Especially in Pakistan, 
company directors have their own side businesses and they often make decisions to get benefits of their own side 
businesses. Particularly in the case of the Pakistani banking industry, directors sanctioned risky loans to their own 
side businesses at the cost of minority shareholders stakes. All these bad decisions may lead to bad firm performance 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Ang et al., 2000; Bennedsen et al., in press; McConaughy et al., 1998; Cronqvist & 
Nilsson, 2003; Maury, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
 
In developed countries it may be true that family ownership enhances the performance of the firms due to 
their cultural phenomena as they have sophisticated and well developed mechanisms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 
2004; McConaughy et al., 1998; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). But in under developing countries like Pakistan where 
things are at a growing stage it is entirely opposite of developed nations (Claessens et al., 2002; Cronqvist & 
Nilsson, 2003; Maury, 2006; Bennedsen et al., in press). In this article, we argue that it is a cultural phenomenon 
that a large board size can increase firms performance because a large board size might be a hurdle for a smaller 
group who wants to do all the ill-doing at the cost of minority shareholders right. 
 
3. DATA AND ESTIMATION 
 
In this section we explain the data sources of governance variables and performance. 
 
3.1 Sample of Data 
 
The Pakistani banking industry is the combination of commercial banks, specialized banks, and state-
owned banks. On the basis of bank performance, a sample of fourteen banks is selected which include commercial 
banks, micro finance banks, and insurance companies. The selected banks also include state owned, private, and 
Islamic banks which are listed on the local Karachi stock exchange. The financial data of the selected banks are 
taken from the annual published financial reports by the State Bank of Pakistan for the period of 2008-2012. This 
time period is important for the Pakistani banking sector because most of the corporate governance codes are drafted 
and implemented during this time span. 
 
3.2 Governance and Performance Variables 
 
Return on equity (ROE), return on asset (ROA), and earning per share (EPS) are taken as proxies for bank 
performance. In the suggested econometric models these variables are computed as dependent variables. For the 
corporate governance variables, board size, number of meetings held, size of audit committee, and number of 
shareholders are used. 
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 highlights the descriptive statistics of governance and performance variables with to banks 
category. 
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Table 1: State Owned Banks 
Descriptive Statistics 
Company Name Average Max Min Stdev 
Bank of Punjab 
Board Size 8 10 7 1.30 
No.of Meeting 10 13 4 3.36 
Size Of Audit 3 4 3 0.45 
Total Shares Held 528797376 528797376 528797376 0.00 
No.of Shareholders 19635.8 20641 18312 849.28 
ROE -8.44 22.52 -61.13 34.24 
ROA -0.13 0.64 -1.50 0.87 
Earning Per Shares (Million) -8.39 3.09 -19.04 10.49648894 
Khyber Bank 
Board Size 7 8 6 0.71 
No.of Meeting 7 8 5 1.30 
Size Of Audit 4 5 4 0.55 
Total Shares Held 624918957 900262030 400406896 221571232.31 
No.of Shareholders 34804.2 36621 32560 1696.70 
ROE 3.88 10.00 -12.00 9.43 
ROA 0.48 1.30 -1.70 1.27 
Earning Per Shares (Million) 0.52 1.29 -1.27 1.08 
 
The Pakistani banking sector had undergone phenomenon financial and structural reforms during the last 
two decades. The first phase of the financial sector reform was introduced in 1990 in which privatization was the 
main objective. During this reform from 1992-1996, state owned banks were partially privatized which later on were 
completely privatized in second phase reforms during 1997-2000. In Table 1, statistics show why state owned banks 
privatized. At this time there are only four state owned banks in Pakistan, but their efficiency and output is not 
satisfactory. The main reason behind this fact is simply bad governance. If we look at the return on equity of state 
owned banks it’s even worse (Berger, Hasan, & Klapper, 2004; Bhattacharya, Lovell, & Sahay, 1997; Isik & 
Hassan, 2002). If they do not generate good profits they cannot survive in the market. 
 
Table 1.1: Islamic Banks 
Descriptive Statistics 
Company Name Average Max Min Stdev 
Bank Islami 
Board Size 8 10 7 1.30 
No.of Meeting 6 7 5 0.84 
Size Of Audit 3 5 3 0.89 
Total Shares Held 527967898 527967898 527967898 0.00 
No.of Shareholders 25936.6 27863 24386 1359.82 
ROE 1.14 8.29 -9.93 7.46 
ROA -0.13 0.79 -1.84 1.05 
Earning Per Shares (Million) 0.12 0.78 -0.93 0.71 
Meezan Bank 
Board Size 10 11 9 0.84 
No.of Meeting 4 5 4 0.55 
Size Of Audit 3 3 3 0.00 
Total Shares Held 712443361 903367473 492596158 154463447.45 
No.of Shareholders 2022.6 2324 1821 191.78 
ROE 18.55 28.18 10.30 7.51 
ROA 1.27 1.90 0.82 0.43 
Earning Per Shares (Million) 2.50 3.88 1.22 1.23 
 
In response to liberalization reforms in financial sectors, many new banks came into the industry with new 
developments and strategies. That made the financial sector more competitive and forced the existing players of the 
market to come up with new products and innovations. Evolution of Islamic banking in Pakistan is the result of this 
competitiveness. Due to the increasing trend of Islamic banking in Pakistan, some new investors encouraged and 
introduced specialized Islamic banks. These Islamic banks are yet to define the explicit difference between Islamic 
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and conventional banking, even though people showed positive attitudes toward them. In return, Islamic banks 
showed some satisfactory outcomes which are quite opposite to the state- owned banks. This is the strong evidence 
of good governance because in the Pakistani environment these banks are new and people don’t have the clear 
vision of true Islamic banking. Despite the fact that Islamic banks market share is competitively low as compared to 
other conventional banks but for Islamic banking there is an opportunity of growth which is associated with true 
Islamic culture (Rosly & Abu Bakar, 2003; Yudistira, 2004). 
 
Table 1.2: Private Banks 
Descriptive Statistics 
Company Name Average Max Min Stdev 
Allied Bank 
Board Size 10 12 9 1.30 
No.of Meeting 8 10 6 1.82 
Size Of Audit 3 4 3 0.55 
Total Shares Held 6.34E+08 9.46E+08 86031092 326283093.58 
No.of Shareholders 20229 20810 19772 436.59 
ROE 0.28 0.31 0.21 0.04 
ROA 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 
Earning Per Shares (Million) 8.73 12.34 4.39 3.05 
Askari Bank 
Board Size 11 13 10 1.30 
No.of Meeting 10 13 4 3.65 
Size Of Audit 3 4 3 0.55 
Total Shares Held 6.15E+08 8.13E+08 4.06E+08 161082725.68 
No.of Shareholders 20756.8 22259 19231 1131.05 
ROE 6.67 9.64 3.06 2.43 
ROA 0.37 0.49 0.20 0.12 
Earning Per Shares (Million) 1.69 2.30 0.95 0.55 
Bank-Alfalah 
Board Size 11 13 9 1.58 
No.of Meeting 5 6 4 0.84 
Size Of Audit 4 6 4 0.89 
Total Shares Held 1.24E+09 1.35E+09 8E+08 245813747.85 
No.of Shareholders 20508.8 26856 16800 4252.53 
ROE 10.93 18.90 4.90 6.45 
ROA 0.51 0.91 0.24 0.32 
Earning Per Shares (Million) 1.76 3.38 0.71 1.19 
Faysal Bank 
Board Size 12 13 10 1.14 
No.of Meeting 5 6 4 0.84 
Size Of Audit 3 4 3 0.45 
Total Shares Held 7.24E+08 9.27E+08 5.3E+08 160030875.32 
No.of Shareholders 14856.2 17494 12947 2309.15 
ROE 4.57 10.57 0.80 4.80 
ROA 9.16 11.18 7.43 1.76 
Earning Per Shares (Million) 1.34 1.53 1.20 0.12 
KASB 
Board Size 12 14 9 2.07 
No.of Meeting 7 8 5 1.22 
Size Of Audit 4 4 3 0.55 
Total Shares Held 1.18E+09 1.95E+09 4.01E+08 729213059.04 
No.of Shareholders 11112.5 20343.5 8127 5176.31 
ROE -63.81 -11.04 -110.02 38.67 
ROA -3.65 -1.20 -7.10 2.37 
Earning Per Shares (Million) -2.37 -0.55 -4.45 1.45 
MCB 
Board Size 13 15 12 1.30 
No.of Meeting 5 6 4 1.00 
Size Of Audit 5 6 4 0.84 
Total Shares Held 7.8E+08 9.2E+08 6.91E+08 98639767.37 
No.of Shareholders 42839.6 44131 41269 1356.06 
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Table 1.2 cont. 
 
ROE 27.21 31.49 25.07 2.53 
ROA 3.22 3.60 2.95 0.24 
Earning Per Shares (Million) 19.16 22.77 16.71 2.69 
NIB Bank 
Board Size 11 14 9 1.92 
No.of Meeting 6 7 5 1.00 
Size Of Audit 3 3 3 0.00 
Total Shares Held 6.31E+09 1.03E+10 2.84E+09 3680105988.39 
No.of Shareholders 29030.2 31993 27222 1946.82 
ROE -21.22 1.66 -74.02 30.89 
ROA -2.26 0.33 -6.15 2.81 
Earning Per Shares (Million) -1.06 0.17 -2.63 1.39 
Soneri Bank 
Board Size 12 14 10 1.79 
No.of Meeting 8 9 6 1.30 
Size Of Audit 4 5 4 0.55 
Total Shares Held 6.84E+08 1E+09 4.11E+08 256573148.82 
No.of Shareholders 9829 10119 9598 213.85 
ROE 6.58 10.63 1.61 4.42 
ROA 0.52 0.89 0.12 0.36 
Earning Per Shares (Million) 0.84 1.70 0.17 0.63 
Summit Bank 
Board Size 11 13 10 1.30 
No.of Meeting 6 7 5 0.89 
Size Of Audit 3 3 3 0.00 
Total Shares Held 8.49E+08 1.08E+09 5E+08 246066335.41 
No.of Shareholders 47854.1 52288 37553.5 6044.55 
ROE -50.80 -3.11 -94.38 39.12 
ROA -2.93 -0.77 -5.41 2.32 
Earning Per Shares (Million) -2.76 -0.38 -5.58 2.13 
UBL 
Board Size 12 14 10 1.58 
No.of Meeting 6 6 5 0.45 
Size Of Audit 4 4 4 0.00 
Total Shares Held 1.16E+09 1.22E+09 1.01E+09 95606083.36 
No.of Shareholders 27301 29307 24924 2004.74 
ROE 21.84 24.30 19.50 2.19 
ROA 1.80 2.20 1.50 0.33 
Earning Per Shares (Million) 10.60 14.71 8.24 2.93 
 
The market share of private banks in the industry is considerably high. This is all because of liberalization 
and privatization reform introduced by the State Bank of Pakistan. Many players participated in this rapid growth 
and earned significant profits. But in a very short period of time, these banks realized the importance of corporate 
governance practice especially when they had competition with foreign banks. Table 1.2 shows a very satisfactory 
image of the private banks as compared to both state-owned and Islamic banks. Several researchers confirm this fact 
(Boubakri et al., 2005b; Boubakri, Cosset, & Guedhami, 2009; Clarke et al., 2005; Lin & Zhang, 2009). Several 
believe that the privatization improves the performance of a bank (Boubakri, Cosset, & Guedhami, 2005; Fries & 
Taci, 2005; Clarke et al., 2005; Beck, Cull, & Jerome, 2005; Bonin et al., 2005). 
 
From the above mentioned descriptive results one can conclude that a bank, no matter if it is conventional 
or Islamic, has a large board size then its profit is better than a bank that has a small board size. 
 
3.4 Estimation of Relationship Between Performance and Governance 
 
Table 2 comprises our results of relationship between performance and governance ignoring the bank type. 
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Table 2 
Correlations 
 
 
Return on Equity in % Board Size Number of Meetings 
Pearson Correlation 
Return on Equity in % 1.00 0.37 -0.22 
Board Size 0.37 1.00 0.09 
Number of Meetings -0.22 0.09 1.00 
Audit Committee size 0.24 0.18 0.00 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
Return on Equity in % . 0.00
**
 0.03 
Board Size 0.00 . 0.24 
Number of Meetings 0.03 0.24 . 
Audit Committee size 0.02
**
 0.07 0.50 
** Significant at alpha 5%  
 
The findings of Table 2 suggest that governance does matter for bank performance which is in accordance 
with existing literature (Smith, 1996; Huson, 1997; Nesbitt, 1994; Carleton et al., 1998; Strickland et al., 1996). An 
interesting finding in Table 2 is that there is a negative correlation between the number of meetings and the return of 
equity (Vafeas, 1999) but has a positive relationship between board size. This is true in the sense that board 
meetings carry different costs like managerial time, travel expense, and meetings fees. In the case of board size it is 
very encouraging for external participants to become the part of the board and increase the firm performance 
(Weisbach, 1988; Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Brickley et al., 1994; Borokhovich et al., 1996; Cotter et al., 1997). 
Secondly we find positive correlation between audit committee and firm performance which is also theoretically 
true. Due to a strong audit committee, firms can achieve better performance (Belkhir, 2009; Vallelado et al., 2008; 
James, 1987; Xie et al., 2003; Lin, 2006, Klein, 2004). 
 
3.5 Governance Influence on ROE, ROA, & EPS 
 
Governance influence on performance (ROE, ROA, & EPS) has been tested through linear regression 
models as given below. 
 
ROE =                    i 
ROA =                    ii 
EPS =                    iii 
 
where: 
 
ROE (Return on Equity), ROA (Retune on Asset), EPS (Earning per share), BS (Board Size), AC (Audit 
Committee) and NM (Number of meetings) 
 
3.6 Governance and Return on Equity 
 
Table 3 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1
*
 0.47 0.22 0.19 27.80 2.1 
ANOVA 
Model 
 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1
*
 Regression 15039.67 3 5013.22 6.48 0.00
**
 
  Residual 51032.23 66 773.22 
  
  Total 66071.90 69 
   
Coefficients 
Model  
Un-standardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized Coefficients T Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
Std. Error Beta 
  
Tolerance VIF 
1
*
 (Constant) -62.05 23.59 
 
-2.63 0.01 
  
  Board Size 6.46 2.01 0.35 3.21 0.00
**
 0.96 1.04 
  Number of Meetings -3.59 1.55 -0.25 -2.32 0.02
**
 0.99 1.01 
  Audit Committee Size 7.02 4.38 0.18 1.60 0.11 0.97 1.03 
* Model 1; ** significance at alpha 5% 
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The above stated findings revealed that there is a significance relationship between return on equity and 
corporate governance variables. The overall P value of the model is < 5% & 1% which shows that the overall model 
is significant (Smith, 1996; Huson, 1997; Nesbitt, 1994; Carleton et al., 1998; Strickland et al., 1996). P-value of 
board size and number of meetings < 5% show that both are significantly positively and negatively related to return 
on equity respectively (Alexander, Fennell, & Halpern, 1993; Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994). 
 
Table 3 cont. 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
2* 0.39 0.15 0.12 2.90 1.95 
ANOVA 
Model 
 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
2* Regression 112.37 3 37.45 4.44 0.00** 
  Residual 640.45 76 8.42 
  
  Total 752.83 79 
   
Coefficients 
Model  
Un-standardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
 
Std. Error Beta 
  
Tolerance VIF 
2* (Constant) -2.15 2.41 
 
-0.89 0.37 
  
  BS 0.44 0.20 0.23 2.19 0.03** 0.96 1.04 
  NM -0.37 0.14 -0.26 -2.53 0.01** 0.99 1.00 
  AS 0.41 0.44 0.10 0.92 0.35 0.96 1.04 
* Model 2; ** significance at alpha 5% 
 
The second model is also showing the expected results as corporate governance variables have influence on 
return on assets. Both board size and the number of meetings are significantly positively and negatively associated 
with return on asset respectively as P-value of both variables are < 5% (Mintz-berg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1972, 1973). R- 
Square value 0.12 and Durbin-Watson value 1.95 give more strength to the results in concluding that corporate 
governance variables have influence on return on asset. 
 
Table 3 cont. 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
3* 0.46 0.21 0.18 6.67 2.05 
ANOVA 
Model 
 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
3* Regression 922.37 3 307.46 6.91 0.00** 
  Residual 3294.07 74 44.51 
  
  Total 4216.44 77 
   
Coefficients 
Model  
Un-standardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
 
Std. Error Beta 
  
Tolerance VIF 
3* (Constant) -14.92 5.56 
 
-2.68 0.01 
  
  BS 1.16 0.23 0.26 5.04 0.00** 0.96 1.04 
  NM -0.54 0.25 -0.16 -2.14 0.02** 1.00 1.00 
  AS 0.35 0.40 0.31 0.88 0.30 0.96 1.04 
* Model 3 
 
Model 3 is also significant at 1% level of significance. It shows that corporate governance variables have 
significant influence on earning per share. As far as board size and the number of meetings are concerned the 
coefficients of both variables are also positively and negatively significant at 5% level of significance respectively 
similar to model 1 and 2. 
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4. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
The primary contribution of this paper to the literature is to find a reverse relationship between board size 
and firm performance. For developed countries it is argued in various studies that a small board size is beneficial for 
firm performance. But in this study it is concluded that a large board size is good for firm performance in the context 
of under developing countries, like Pakistan (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
 
Statistical results also supported our argument that a large board size accelerates the performance of the 
enterprises. It is very difficult to manage a large board in firms which causes delays in executing important decisions 
and creates hidden costs for firms but at the same time it is very beneficial for firm performance for countries like 
Pakistan in which Seith and Vehdra exploit the rights of minor shareholders. In a situation where board size is small, 
these Seith or Vehdra appoints their likeminded persons as director and abuse the rights of minor shareholders. This 
argument is supported by the results shown in the Table 1, which shows that banks having smaller board sizes have 
not performed as well as those banks that have large board sizes in the case of state owned banks. In the case of 
private banks they are quite smart as compared to the state-owned banks as they have larger board sizes and 
encourage transparency, innovation, and accountability to enhance their performance. 
 
In concluding the argument, this study is idealizing the resource dependent theory that is a larger board size 
can enhance the performance of a company (Alexander, Fennell, & Halpern, 1993; Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 
1994; Mintz-berg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Provan, 1980). 
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